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HATE SPEECH IN THE SCHOOLS: A POTENTIAL
CHANGE IN DIRECTION
Kevin W. Saunders*
The law regarding free expression and students in the public schools has long
been somewhat confused. An early Supreme Court vindication of student speech
rights has eroded over the years. Yet, it is perhaps unclear how great the erosion
has been and how much of the original recognition still stands. This has left the
lower courts rather unwilling to protect school students from hate speech, at least in
cases where there has not been a history of such speech leading to disruption or
even violence. Only recently has there been some sign of change in that regard,
with a few courts coming to recognize that the Supreme Court cases allow
restrictions on student use of racist, sexist, or homophobic invective toward other
students, even when such disruption and violence are lacking.
This article will argue that those recent court decisions are justified under
Supreme Court precedent. The article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the
Supreme Court’s treatment of school speech. The school hate speech cases in the
lower courts are then considered in Part II. That treatment splits the cases into two
eras, the first running from the Supreme Court’s recognition of free expression
rights in the schools to the first significant erosion, and the second from that
erosive case to the present. In each era, the lessons drawn by the lower courts
regarding hate speech are presented but are followed with the lessons it is
suggested could have been drawn that would have been more protective of the
targets of hate speech. Part III looks at the more recent decisions protecting
students from hate speech and argues that these cases are correctly decided. Lastly,
Part IV looks to the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on student speech
to argue that the lessons suggested from the earlier cases are still valid.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S SCHOOL SPEECH CASES
An analysis of the regulation of hate speech in the public schools must begin
with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.1 Tinker grew
out of a protest against the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.2 As a part of
the protest, a number of students wore black armbands.3 The district’s principals
had decided that such a display would be met with a demand to remove the bands
and suspension for those who refused.4 A number of students did refuse and
challenged their penalties under the First Amendment.5
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the special characteristics
* Professor and Charles Clarke Chair in Constitutional Law, Michigan State University. A.B.,
Franklin & Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan.
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. Id. at 504.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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of the schools must be taken into account in any free expression analysis, but the
Court said that these rights do exist in the school context, stating “[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”6 It was important to the Court, in
holding that the students’ rights had been violated, that the protest had been silent
and passive, with no interference with the educational process or the rights of
others.7 There was no disruption of any class, and while there was some hostility
expressed by other students outside the classroom, there were no threats of violence
or actual violence.8 The district may have feared disturbance, but the Court said
“in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”9
The Court noted that any disagreement with the views of the majority may
cause trouble or raise fear of disturbance, at least in the form of an argument.10
Despite that potential outcome, it is something we must abide.11 Rather,
[i]n order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
12
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.

In that regard, the Court said “the record fails to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students.”13
It is interesting and important to note that the school system had allowed the
wearing of other potentially message-bearing items, including campaign buttons
and a German Iron Cross.14 What was singled out was one particular item bearing
on an issue that was in controversy throughout the country.15 The school elected to
support one side of an ongoing debate: support of the United States’ involvement in
Vietnam could be expressed, but disagreement was barred. This use of the schools
to suppress one side of a societal debate is particularly troubling.16 This may be the
focus of the Court’s statement that “students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.”17
The extension of Tinker to prevent schools from limiting hate speech within
their confines would seem unwarranted. It is argued elsewhere that the real
problem raised by the action of the principals in Des Moines was this imposition of
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 506.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“[O]ur Constitution says we must take this risk.”).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 510-11.
Id.
Id. at 511.
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a favored view in an ongoing political debate.18 Hurling racial expletives at
another student is not participation in an ongoing political debate, even if there is
such a debate over whether such limitations should be allowed. At any rate, Tinker
seems to have been the high water mark for free speech in the schools, and later
cases call into question its continuing strength.
The first such case is Board of Education v. Pico.19 Analyzing the case is
complicated by its procedural context and the lack of a majority opinion. The case
may be seen as another victory for free expression rights in the schools, but its
relevance is limited. The issue in Pico was access to books in a school library.20
Conservative members of the local school board expressed concern over the
presence of books in the library that they characterized as “anti-American, antiChristian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.”21 After receiving recommendations
from a committee of parents and school staff who reviewed the books in
controversy for “‘educational suitability,’ ‘good taste,’ ‘relevance,’ and
‘appropriateness to age and grade level,’” the Board largely rejected the committee
recommendations and ordered the removal of most of the books on their original
list, reprieving one book and allowing access to a second with parental approval.22
When a group of students challenged the removal of the books, the Court
found only that the complaint merited a trial.23 The lower court had granted the
school district summary judgment, which is allowable only if there are no genuine
issues of material fact to be resolved at trial; that is, even taking the available
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the district would be entitled
to judgment.24 The problem, according to the Court, was that in First Amendment
cases the intent of the government is crucial, and that intent had not been probed at
a trial.25
As mentioned, there was no majority opinion. A plurality of Justice Brennan,
with only Justices Marshall and Stevens in complete support and with Justice
Blackmun in partial support, began by recognizing that school boards must have
broad discretion in managing their schools’ affairs.26 The plurality accepted the
position of the district that “local school boards must be permitted ‘to establish and
apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,’ and that
‘there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for
authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political.’”27 But, the
district must exercise its discretion in harmony with the requirements of the First
Amendment.28

18. See KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 255 (2003).
19. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
20. Id. at 855-56.
21. Id. at 857 (correction in original).
22. Id. at 857-58.
23. Id. at 872.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 873-74.
26. Id. at 861-62.
27. Id. at 864 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10 Bd. Of Educ. V. Pico, 457 US 853 (1982) (No. 802043), 1981 WL 390269).
28. Id.
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The discretion of the district applies most strongly to the curriculum itself.29
The board must decide what to teach, but the plurality saw the library in a different
light.30 Students have not only whatever right Tinker provides to express
themselves, but also a right to receive information.31 The Court stated:
Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values. But we
think that petitioners’ reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as here, they
attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory
environment of the classroom, into the school library and the regime of voluntary
32
inquiry that there holds sway.

So, what limitations would the First Amendment pose to school board attempts to
limit the availability of books in their libraries? In answer to that question, the
plurality looked not so much to result but to motive, stating:
[School boards] rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content of
their school libraries. But that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly
partisan or political manner. If a Democratic school board, motivated by party
affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans,
few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the students
denied access to those books. The same conclusion would surely apply if an
all-white school board, motivated by racial animus, decided to remove all books
authored by blacks or advocating racial equality and integration. Our Constitution
33
does not permit the official suppression of ideas.

Since the plaintiffs had alleged that the Board’s decision was based on a concern
that the books were “anti-American” 34 and contrary to the Board members’
“personal values, morals and tastes,” the board decision was suspect, and the
complaint merited a trial.35 The grant of summary judgment was vacated and the
case was remanded.36
As mentioned, Justice Blackmun joined the plurality only in part. He did not
rest on a view of the role of school libraries but wrote more generally of the limits
on states, saying “the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because
state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons.”37 Applying
that principle to the schools, he said:
In my view, we strike a proper balance here by holding that school officials may
not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or
29. Id.
30. Id. at 869.
31. Id. at 868 (“Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US 589 (1967), observed that ‘students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding.’”).
32. Id. at 869.
33. Id. at 870-71.
34. Two board members had objected to a statement in one of the books that George Washington
had owned slaves. One of them said “I believe it is anti-American to present one of the nation’s heroes,
the first President, . . . in such a negative and obviously one-sided life.” Id. at 873 n.25 (citation to
footnote only).
35. Id. at 875.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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social perspectives discussed in them . . . . [T]he school board must “be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,”
and that the board had something in mind in addition to the suppression of partisan
or political views it did not share. . . . First Amendment principles would allow a
school board to refuse to make a book available to students because it contains
offensive language, or because it is psychologically or intellectually inappropriate
for the age group, or even, perhaps, because the ideas it advances are “manifestly
38
inimical to the public welfare.”

Justice Blackmun’s position seems consistent with the view expressed above that
the evil to be addressed is the political suppression of ideas.39 Even then, he would
allow the suppression of ideas that are not simply discomforting to the majority but
that are “inimical to the public welfare.” What would fit that classification better
than racial epithets?
There is still a fifth vote to be accounted for in the decision to remand. That
vote came from Justice White. While he agreed that there was a factual dispute and
that summary judgment had been inappropriate, he criticized the plurality for
“issu[ing] a dissertation on the extent to which the First Amendment limits the
discretion of the school board to remove books from the school library.”40 That
position certainly limits the effect of language in the plurality opinion, leaving only
the conclusion that motive matters and that political motive is of special concern.
The next case, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,41 resulted from what
was characterized as a lewd speech given at a high school assembly.42 Fraser, a
student, gave the speech in nomination of a fellow student for a student government
office.43 The Court described the speech as “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit
sexual metaphor.”44 Fraser gave the speech after having been warned by two
teachers, who knew its content, that there could be consequences.45 Student
reaction ran from hooting, yelling, and sexually suggestive gestures on the part of
some to embarrassment on the part of others, some as young as fourteen.46 Fraser
38. Id. at 879-80 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)) (other internal citations omitted).
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. Pico, 457 U.S. at 883 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
42. Id. at 677.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 677-78.
45. Id. at 678. In the hate speech cases to be discussed, the students, like Fraser, were warned that
this speech or expression would violate school rules. Professor Emily Gold Waldman sees a difference
between suppression of speech and punishment for speech. See Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating
Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113 (2010). She argues that principles
of due process require that, when punishment is imposed based on speech, the punished student should
have had adequate prior notice that the speech violated school rules and that the actual punishment
should be reasonable. Id. at 1147. Setting aside the issue of reasonableness of the punishment, which
would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, she says that “the clearest form of such notice will
occur when the school responds to a particular instance of speech, either by warning the student speaker
in advance not to engage in the specific speech in question (as in Tinker and Fraser) and/or by telling
the student to stop speaking.” Id. at 1140. That has been the situation in the cases to be discussed,
where, for example, students have been told to turn a T-shirt inside out or wear something else.
46. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
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was suspended and removed from the list of potential graduation speakers for
violating a school rule against “[c]onduct which materially and substantially
interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures.”47
When Fraser’s challenge to the action reached the Supreme Court, the Court
decided that Tinker was not controlling.48 The Court saw a “marked distinction
between the political ‘message’ of the arm-bands in Tinker and the sexual content
of respondent’s speech in this case.”49 In Tinker, there had been “a nondisruptive,
passive expression of a political viewpoint” that had not affected the educational
process while the speech in Fraser disrupted a participatory exercise in student
government, which could be relevant under Tinker.50 Going beyond Tinker, the
Court pointed to the role of the schools in inculcating the fundamental values and
civility needed for democracy to flourish.51 The Court noted:
These fundamental values and “habits and manners of civility” essential to a
democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and
religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these
“fundamental values” must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities
of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in
52
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.

This language would seem to distinguish between political speech and racist
invective at least as well as it does between political speech and vulgarity.
The Court recognized that it had ruled in Cohen v. California53 that far more
offensive language than that uttered by Fraser was protected when expressed in
public, but said “[i]t does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an
offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the
speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children
in a public school.”54 The Court went on to say:
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the
use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the “fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” disfavor the
use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in
the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression
are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly
the “work of the schools.” The determination of what manner of speech in the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 678.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
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classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
55
board.

Again, consider how much more injurious, offensive, and threatening racist speech
is compared to somewhat lewd speech, and then note that the Court allowed the
suppression of such lewd speech in Fraser.
Turning to the most recent of this line of cases,56 we come to what has become
known as the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case.57 The case, Morse v. Frederick,58 gets its
name from a banner unfurled at a high school sponsored event.59 The torch relay
for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City was to pass through Juneau,
Alaska.60 The principal of Juneau-Douglas High School, a school on the route of
the torch, decided to make an event of the relay by allowing students and staff to
leave class to line the street down which the relay would proceed.61 As the torch
and its accompanying camera crews passed, Frederick, a senior at the high school,
and some friends unfurled a fourteen foot long banner reading “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.”62 The banner was easily seen by students and others.63 The principal,
Morse, crossed the street and ordered that the banner be taken down.64 While his
friends were compliant, Frederick refused.65 The principal then took the banner,
and Frederick was suspended from school.66 The action was based on a belief that
the banner promoted drug use, in violation of school rules—rules that applied both
in school and at school sponsored events and trips.67
Frederick filed suit seeking not only a declaratory and injunctive vindication of
his free speech rights but also monetary damages.68 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, it found that his free expression rights had not been violated.69 The
Court accepted, as reasonable, the principal’s belief that the sign advocated the use
55. Id. at 683 (citations omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)).
56. Most treatments of student speech would include, between Fraser and the case to follow, the
school newspaper case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). That case
represented, however, a decision not to publish articles in a school newspaper. Id. at 262-64. It was
non-punitive in any sense, other than not seeing one’s writing in print. There was no disciplinary action.
It represents, then, simply a refusal to include certain content in a publication that could reasonably be
seen as expression by the school itself. There is language in the opinion that supports the position taken
here, most notably “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic
educational mission,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”
Id. at 266 (citation omitted). This point, however, is made elsewhere in more relevant cases.
57. Bill Mears, “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” Case limits student rights, CNN (June 25, 2007),
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-06-25/justice/free.speech_1_principal-deborah-morse-banner-case-schoolpolicy?_s=PM:LAW.
58. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
59. Id. at 396.
60. Id. at 397.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 398.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 399.
69. Id. at 400.
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of marijuana.70 It also distinguished this advocacy of drug use from taking a
political position on the legalization of marijuana.71
Given the Court’s understanding of the message, the question became whether
the schools can restrict student speech in the context of a student event and,
presumably, a fortiori in the school itself, reasonably believed to promote drug
use.72 The Court determined that doing so was not a violation of the First
Amendment, and in doing so, it gave its most recent view of the meaning of the
school speech cases.
With regard to Tinker, the Court found the facts there “quite stark, implicating
concerns at the heart of the First Amendment.”73 The speech in Tinker was
political expression the protection of which is “at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect.”74 Where the only interest on the part of the
school was the prevention of the sort of discomfort that a minority political view
may bring, that could not justify the suppression of student speech.75
Proceeding on to Fraser, the Court said the mode of analysis employed there
“is not entirely clear.”76 While the Court
was plainly attuned to the content of Fraser’s speech, citing the “marked
distinction between the political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the
sexual content of [Fraser’s] speech.” . . . [T]he Court also reasoned that school
boards have the authority to determine “what manner of speech in the classroom or
77
in school assembly is inappropriate.”

Declining to resolve completely the lack of clarity, the Court was willing to “distill
. . . two basic principles”:78
First, Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.” Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the
school context, it would have been protected. In school, however, Fraser’s First
Amendment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment.” Second, Fraser established that the mode of analysis set
forth in Tinker is not absolute. Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly
79
did not conduct the “substantial disruption” analysis prescribed by Tinker.

While the school district argued that Fraser should be interpreted to allow the
suppression of the speech at issue because it was offensive in the sense used in
Fraser, the Court declined.80 The Court said:

70. Id. at 401.
71. See id. at 403 (“[T]his is plainly not a case about political debate over the criminalization of
drug use or possession.”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).
75. Id. at 403-04.
76. Id. at 404.
77. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680, 683 (1986)).
78. Id. at 404.
79. Id. at 404-05 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 409.
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We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass
any speech that could fit under some definition of “offensive.” After all, much
political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some. The
concern here is not that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was
81
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.

Agreeing that Frederick’s speech was offensive would have been stretching the
class of speech Fraser allowed to be suppressed, perhaps beyond the breaking
point. Racist speech, however, can be included in the Fraser concept with far
greater ease. Such speech is easily more offensive than the sexually suggestive—
but not explicit—speech in Fraser.
Turning to the application of the case law to the treatment of the banner,82 the
Court found the government interest in deterring student drug use to be important
and even perhaps compelling.83 This government interest has its effect on the
permissibility of speech regulation in the schools. The Court noted that
Tinker warned that schools may not prohibit student speech because of
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.” The danger here is far more serious and palpable. The particular
concern to prevent student drug abuse at issue here . . . extends well beyond an
84
abstract desire to avoid controversy.

That made it reasonable for the principal to take the actions she did.85
There was an important concurrence in Morse. Justice Alito, joined by Justice
Kennedy, expressed their view of the majority decision, and since their votes were
necessary to forming a majority, any limits expressed cannot be ignored. The two
justices joined the Court’s opinion on the understanding that it addressed only
illegal drug use and “provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including
speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing
marijuana for medicinal use.’”86 The concurrence went on to say, “I do not read
the opinion to mean that there are necessarily any grounds for such regulation that
are not already recognized in the holdings of this court.”87 The concern was over
argument that had been offered in the case that school officials should be allowed
81. Id.
82. The Court did also briefly consider the school newspaper case, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), but, as suggested above, also thought it to be of minimal relevance.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text. The Court viewed the newspaper case as turning on the
potential for the public to believe that the content of the paper was speech by the school. Morse, 551
U.S. at 405. The Court said that Kuhlmeier did not control this case because the same inference that the
expression was that of the school could not reasonably be drawn with regard to Frederick’s banner. Id.
The Court did, however, find the case to have some limited relevance, stating that “Kuhlmeier
acknowledged that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though the government could not censor
similar speech outside the school.’ And, like Fraser, it confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only
basis for restricting student speech.” Id. at 405-06 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266).
83. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 410.
86. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
87. Id.
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to censor any speech that interfered with the school’s educational mission.88 Since
an educational mission could include views on political and social issues, the
schools could not be allowed to censor contrary speech.89 Drugs, on the other
hand, were seen to be a threat to student safety—potentially as serious a threat as
violence within the school—therefore, the restrictions on speech were accepted by
the Court.90
II. LOWER COURT CASES ON HATE SPEECH IN SCHOOLS FROM TINKER TO THE
RECENT PAST
The analysis in this section will look primarily at two distinct eras, or at least
what should have been two distinct eras. The first begins with Tinker and lasts
through Fraser. Pico is not used to split that first era in two on the grounds that it
says little about speech by students and serves primarily to focus Tinker on political
speech. The second era is from Fraser th rough the present. After a discussion of
those eras and an analysis of a potential change in direction in this area, the impact
of Morse will be discussed.
A. From Tinker to Fraser
1. Tinker Lessons Drawn by the Lower Courts
There were not many cases considering school hate speech in the era between
Tinker and Fraser, but the cases that did reach the lower courts were resolved
based on the question from Tinker as to whether the student speech at issue “would
substantially interfere with the work of the school.”91 The analysis of that issue
tended to be highly fact specific, with courts delving into the history of hate speech
and race relations at the schools adopting the speech limitations.
Melton v. Young92 demonstrates this reliance. The case grew out of a situation
at Brainerd High School, a public school in Chattanooga, Tennessee.93 The school,
which had been integrated in 1966, retained its nickname “Rebel” and Dixie as its
pep song from its pre-integration all-white days.94 In 1969, continuing controversy
over the use of the Confederate flag and Dixie led to demonstrations, disrupted
classes, and other disturbances, to the point where a citywide curfew was initiated
for four nights.95 Police had to be called to the school, and at one point, the school
was closed.96
A committee appointed to study the situation recommended that the
Confederate flag no longer be used as a school symbol and that Dixie no longer be
the school pep song, although it was recommended that the nickname “Rebel” be

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id.
Id.

176

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

retained.97 The school board adopted the recommendations and directed the school
administration to develop a student code of conduct consistent with the
recommendations.98 The code prohibited the use of “provocative symbols on
clothing” and said that all displays of the Confederate flag and Confederate soldiers
were to be removed from the school premises.99
Melton, despite being informed of the new rules, wore a jacket with a
Confederate flag on its sleeve to school.100 He was asked to remove it but refused
and went to class.101 After complaints from both faculty and students, he was again
asked to remove the jacket or told he would have to leave school.102 Although he
left, he came back the next day with the same jacket.103 He said he was
demonstrating pride in his Confederate heritage but was again told to leave and not
return in the jacket.104
When Melton challenged the order as a violation of his free expression rights,
the Sixth Circuit adopted the conclusion of the trial court that “[t]he Principal had
every right to anticipate that a tense, racial situation continued to exist at Brainerd
High School . . . and that repetition of the previous year’s disorders might reoccur
if student use of the Confederate symbol was permitted to resume.”105 The
appellate court said that the district judge had undertaken a careful consideration of
the law and the situation at the high school and was justified in concluding that
the record in the present case reflects quite clearly that there was substantial
disorder at Brainerd High School throughout the 1969-70 school year, that this
disorder most materially disrupted the functioning of the school, so much so that
the school was in fact closed upon two occasions, that much of the controversy the
previous year had centered around the use of the Confederate flag as a school
symbol and that the school officials had every right to anticipate that a tense racial
106
situation continued to exist as of the opening of school in September 1970.

It was clear that the history of disturbances made the difference, establishing the
real and substantial fear of disruption that Tinker seemed to demand.107
The Fifth Circuit, in a somewhat different procedural context, showed the
same attention to the history of strife at a school in determining whether an
injunction against the use of the Confederate battle flag and the name “Rebels”
violated student first amendment rights. In Augustus v. School Board,108 the court
had to consider a mix of first amendment and equal protection issues. The school
system was under the continuing jurisdiction of the district court to implement
desegregation.109 The district court had issued a permanent injunction against the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 1333-34.
See id. at 1334 n.2.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the district court).
Id. at 1335 (quoting the district court).
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 154.
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use of the Confederate flag because it saw the symbol and the “Rebel” name as
standing in the way of establishing a unitary school system.110
There was history tying the symbol and name to disruptions. In the 1972-73
school year, which was the fourth year of any significant integration for the district,
its high school experienced racial disturbances.111 There were four major
confrontations involving fighting between black and white students and a number
of lesser disturbances.112 Law enforcement officers were called to the school and
remained for the year; the school was closed twice.113 The court said that one
source of the racial tension was the use of the Confederate symbols.114 The court
concluded that the injunction was not a violation of student first amendment rights,
noting that student expression may be limited where that expression leads to
violence and disruption.115
2. The Tinker Lesson That Could Have Been Drawn
Setting aside the fact that Tinker actually phrased its test in the form of a
disjunction of substantial disruption or interference with the rights of others, with
the second disjunct ignored until much later cases,116 it is not really clear that the
first disjunct should have been seen as requiring the sort of violence and physical
disruption looked for by the lower courts.
An understanding of the disruption that should have been found sufficient to
justify limits on student speech might have been found in Brown v. Board of
Education.117 The Court in Brown asked itself the simple—at least in its
wording—question: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities?” and answered that question by stating: “We believe that it does.”118
The Court said:
To separate [children in elementary and high schools] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
119
unlikely ever to be undone.

The conclusion was that educational segregation, in itself, deprives minority
children of equal educational opportunity: separate but equal was an

110. Id.
111. Id. at 155.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 155-56.
115. Id. at 156. The Fifth Circuit did remand the case on the issue of whether the school board could
have developed, had it been given the opportunity, a solution to the problem less drastic than that in the
injunction.
116. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. Id. at 493.
119. Id. at 494.
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impossibility.120 Segregation implies racial inferiority, and that affects motivation
to learn and retards educational and mental development.121
The issue in Brown was, of course, legally established segregation, rather than
the sting of racist speech, but the effect may well be the same. It may even be that
racist speech directed at a child in the classroom, cafeteria, or elsewhere in school
could have a stronger impact on a child than finding himself or herself in a single
race school, especially if the legal details of that result are not explained to the
child. Many children would not have understood the law behind segregated
schools and may not have suffered from the inferiority that concerned the Court,
although certainly older students would have.
But, what of the child who hears hate speech in the schools and sees that it is
tolerated by the school authorities? It would seem that acceptance of racist speech,
if the schools do not attempt to stop it, would lead to the same belief that society
has accepted a theory of racial inferiority. Perhaps someone versed in the
complexities of free expression law would not draw the same conclusion, but that is
a bit much to expect of an elementary or even high school student. Even with an
explanation, it might well be seen as a majority protection for the assertion of
minority inferiority.
It would, then, seem reasonable to conclude that hate speech has a negative
impact on the educational process. It is inherently disruptive of the schools’
mission. Unless Tinker is limited to violence and the effects of noise—and the
language of the case does not seem so limited—hate speech is disruptive in the
sense necessary to allow its suppression. The political speech in Tinker might
merit protection up until the point of disruption. How else would we distinguish
political distaste from interference with the educational process? But, all hate
speech may be seen as disruptive, even without indication of violence. This may
best be seen in the limiting case of a single minority student who is constantly
subjected to racist speech. Facing such overwhelming odds, he or she may not
respond with any level of violence. But, the subject of such abuse will not receive
the education the school system is charged with providing. The educational
process will have been disrupted in a way that should allow, under a combination
of Tinker and Brown, the suppression of the speech of the other students.122
B. Post-Fraser
In the years following Fraser, the number of cases involving school limitation
on hate speech grew significantly. They might also be seen to have increased in
complexity. The lower courts seemed to continue their reliance on the substantial
disruption aspect of Tinker, apparently not seeing any real change resulting from
the Fraser decision. Some of the later cases did, at least, begin to recognize the
disjunctive nature of the Tinker test. After examining the work of the courts in this
120. Id. at 495.
121. Id. at 494.
122. There is an interesting symmetry here between the genesis of Tinker and its proposed limitation.
Professor Kristi Bowman has demonstrated how Tinker’s disruption test grew out of the civil rights
movement. See generally Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 1129 (2009). The suggested limitation, of course, grows out of that same movement.
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era, how Fraser could be seen as adding authority to bar hate speech will be
examined.
1. Fraser (and leftover Tinker) Lessons Drawn by the Lower Courts
One of the first cases123 in this era at the federal appellate level was the Tenth
Circuit case West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260.124 In the Kansas
school district at issue in that case, there had been a number of racial incidents.125
It was in response to those incidents that the district adopted a “Racial Harassment
and Intimidation” policy.126
The policy prohibited racial harassment or
intimidation through name calling or the use of racial slurs.127 It also prohibited
possession in school or at school events of written material that is “racially divisive
or creates ill will or hatred.”128 Among the examples given of such material was
the Confederate flag.129
The incident that gave rise to the case occurred when a seventh grade student,
while in mathematics class, drew a Confederate flag on a piece of paper.130 When
the student was suspended for three days, the student’s parents sued the district,
alleging violations of the student’s constitutional rights, the most important such
violation being to the student’s First Amendment rights.131
In examining the First Amendment issue, the court carefully examined the
historical background for the policy.132 That background included a series of

123. There is an earlier, but still post-Fraser, case that is interesting primarily because it
distinguished elementary from secondary school. Baxter ex rel Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26
F.3d 728 (7th Cir.1994), was not an actual hate speech case. Instead, a student wore T-shirts to school
bearing the legends “Unfair Grades,” “Racism” and “I Hate Lost Creek”; “Lost Creek” being the name
of the student’s elementary school. Id. at 730. After the school prohibited the student from wearing the
shirts, the court dismissed a damages suit against the school and granted the defendants immunity, both
because it saw Fraser as casting some doubt on the vitality of Tinker and because it was unclear that
Tinker should apply to elementary school. Id. at 738. For more on the distinction between elementary
and secondary school, see infra notes 207-21 and accompanying text.
There is another case, roughly contemporaneous with West, that also raises the issue of qualified
immunity. Denno v. School Board, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000), involved the Confederate battle flag
displayed by a student at a school and a Confederate flag T-shirt worn by another. Here, too, there was
a suit for damages, and the court determined that a reasonable school official would not have known that
Tinker still controlled, to the exclusion of Fraser. Id. at 1274-75. The court noted that Fraser had said
that the “work of the schools” included inculcating fundamental values and civility, and said: “We do
not believe it would be unreasonable for school officials to believe that such displays have uncivil
aspects akin to those referred to in Fraser . . . .” Id. at 1274.
124. 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000). The court did note two other federal appellate cases involving
Confederate flags. One was fairly old. See Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972). The other
was quite recent but had been vacated by the panel that had issued the opinion, rehearing had been
ordered, and the case was still pending. See generally Denno, 182 F.3d 780.
125. West, 206 F.3d at 1361.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (emphasis omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1361-62.
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verbal confrontations between black and white students at the high school.133
Some of the confrontations were of a sartorial bent: some white students wore
shirts with an image of the Confederate flag, and some black students wore shirts
with an “X”, referring to Malcolm X.134 The confrontations drew attention in the
wider community, and groups such as the Aryan Nation and Ku Klux Klan took
advantage of what they saw as an opportunity to begin distributing their
materials.135 There were additional incidents on school buses and at football games
as well as a fight involving a student wearing a Confederate flag headband.136
Racist and threatening graffiti also began to appear in and around the school.137 It
was against that background that the district policy was adopted, and the policy
seemed to result in a significant decline in racial problems.138
In the court’s view, the students were well aware of the policy, and the student
knew that drawing the flag was a violation.139 The question was whether the
drawing of the flag, in what the student saw as a “peaceful and nonthreatening”
situation and in which he had no intent to harass, was protected by the First
Amendment.140 The court concluded that it was not.141
The court accepted that the student’s display of the flag could be considered
political speech that would be protected outside the schools and repeated the Tinker
sobriquet that “students do not ‘shed the constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”142 On the other hand, the court recognized
that a “school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission . . . . Thus, where school authorities reasonably believe that a
student’s uncontrolled exercise of expression might ‘substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students,’ they may forbid
such expression.”143 While undifferentiated fear of a disturbance was insufficient
under Tinker to allow suppression of speech, here there was good reason to believe

133. Id. at 1362.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. It has been noted that the kind of disruption required by even a limited view of Tinker need
not be violent. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008), found sufficient justification for a ban on
the Confederate flag in graffiti that had disrupted classes. The court did note that “the racist graffiti was
violent in character: the graffiti contained examples of the most demeaning racial slurs, accompanied by
threats against the lives of African-Americans generally, an image of a noose next to that of a
Confederate flag, and ‘hit lists’ containing specific students’ names.” Id. at 566. Where racist graffiti is
accompanied by even occasional physical confrontations, it seems adequate support for a ban on the
Confederate flag. See A. M. v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 226 (5th Cir. 2009).
137. West, 206 F.3d at 1362.
138. Id.
139. The court was less sure with regard to any intent to harass. The flag was shown to another
white student, which would not indicate an intent to harass. The court also noted, however, that the
student who drew the flag had earlier received a three day suspension for calling another student
“blackie.” See id. at 1363.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1365.
143. Id. at 1365-66 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
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that the display of the Confederate flag would cause disruption and interfere with
the security of other students.144
Shortly after West, the Third Circuit entered the arena with Saxe v. State
College Area School District.145 That case, too, was a challenge to a school system
anti-harassment policy.
The district’s Anti-Harassment Policy provided a
definition of “harassment” that would prove to be too broad.146 “Harassment
means verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or perceived race, religion,
color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other personal
characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with
a student’s educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment.”147 “Other personal characteristics” was a broad category
that included “clothing, physical appearance, social skills, peer group, intellect,
educational program, hobbies or values, etc.”148
The policy was challenged because of a perceived effect it would have on
comments regarding the sinfulness of homosexual conduct.149 The court found the
breadth of the policy an unacceptable limit on first amendment rights:
Insofar as the policy attempts to prevent students from making negative comments
about each others’ “appearance,” “clothing,” and “social skills,” it may be brave,
futile, or merely silly. But attempting to proscribe negative comments about
“values,” as that term is commonly used today, is something else altogether. By
prohibiting disparaging speech directed at a person’s “values,” the Policy strikes at
the heart of moral and political discourse--the lifeblood of constitutional self
government (and democratic education) and the core concern of the First
150
Amendment.

This limit on comments regarding beliefs, rather than invective directed at core
and unchangeable characteristics, such as race, does raise significant free
expression issues.
Turning to the analysis of First Amendment rights in the schools, the court in
Saxe began with a discussion of Tinker, noting that undifferentiated fear of
disturbance is insufficient and that speech regulation by the schools is only
permitted if the speech would be a substantial disruption of, or interference with,
the educational process or the rights of other students.151 The fear required by
Tinker must be “specific and significant . . . not just some remote apprehension of
disturbance.”152
144. Id. at 1366. For a far more recent sole reliance on the disruption aspect of Tinker, see Hardwick
v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725 (D.S.C. 2009). There, the court cited a history of past and present
hostility and tension that would reasonably have led to the conclusion that permitting Confederate flag
T-shirts would result in substantial disruption of school activities. Id. at 736. See also B.W.A. v.
Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009) (allowing a ban on Confederate flags in a
school situation involving a history of race-based violence).
145. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
146. Id. at 202.
147. Id. (quoting the policy).
148. Id. at 203.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 210.
151. See id. at 211-13.
152. Id. at 211.
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Unlike the West court, the Saxe court also discussed Fraser as part of a
concession that “[s]ince Tinker, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of
narrow categories of speech that a school may restrict even without the threat of
substantial disruption.”153 The court took the Fraser Court’s discussion of the
difference between allowing offensive speech by adults in public and not allowing
Fraser’s nomination speech in school as an indication that the Fraser result is
limited.154 “According to Fraser, then, there is no First Amendment protection for
‘lewd,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘indecent,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ speech in school.”155 It also
seems clear that the category of the “plainly offensive” was limited, in the court’s
view, to the other categories in the quotation, despite the redundancy in the
statement that such a view would cause.156
The court found the policy to violate the First Amendment, expressing a
willingness to allow the suppression of student speech only if the real potential for
disruption it saw as called for by Tinker existed or the speech was vulgar or lewd,
as in Fraser.157
[T]he Policy does not confine itself merely to vulgar or lewd speech; rather, it
reaches any speech that interferes or is intended to interfere with educational
performance or that creates or is intended to create a hostile environment. While
some Fraser-type speech may fall within this definition, the Policy’s scope is
clearly broader. . . . [T]he Policy, even narrowly read, prohibits a substantial
amount of non-vulgar, non-sponsored student speech. [The district] must therefore
satisfy the Tinker test by showing that the Policy’s restrictions are necessary to
prevent substantial disruption or interference with the work of the school or the
158
rights of other students.

The school system policy was limited to speech that had the “purpose or effect
of . . . substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance or . . .
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment,” yet there is the
implication that the “substantial disruption or interference with the work of the
school” of Tinker would be lacking.159 It would seem that an interference with
educational performance should also constitute an interference with the work of the
school. The problem, however, was that “the Policy punishes not only speech that
actually causes disruption, but also speech that merely intends to do so . . . . This
ignores Tinker’ s requirement that a school must reasonably believe that speech
will cause actual, material disruption before prohibiting it.”160 Furthermore, while
the court did agree that prohibiting speech that would “substantially interfer[e] with
a student’s educational performance” could satisfy Tinker, to include speech that
“creat[es] an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment” was more
problematic.161 Even recognizing the other prong of the Tinker test, the court said
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id.
See id. at 212-13.
Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 216-17.
Id.
Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that the hostile environment aspect of the school system’s provision did not require
the severity or pervasiveness that might be necessary to meet the Tinker factor of
“intrud[ing] upon . . . the rights of other students.”162 The court stated:
Because the Policy’s “hostile environment” prong does not, on its face, require any
threshold showing of severity or pervasiveness, it could conceivably be applied to
cover any speech about some enumerated personal characteristics the content of
which offends someone. This could include much “core” political and religious
speech: the Policy’s “Definitions” section lists as examples of covered harassment
“negative” or “derogatory” speech about such contentious issues as “racial
customs,” “religious tradition,” “language,” “sexual orientation,” and “values.”
Such speech, when it does not pose a realistic threat of substantial disruption, is
163
within a student’s First Amendment rights.

The policy in Saxe clearly went beyond the concerns addressed in West, as
well as those addressed in Tinker and Fraser. By including sanctionable comments
that called into question another student’s values, the policy reached matters clearly
within the protection of the First Amendment. Much truly political debate can be
seen as calling into question the values held or expressed by the opposing party.
The suppression of such speech is a violation of expression rights even in the
schools, as clearly held by Tinker. The line between calling into question the value
of accepting homosexuality and insulting another because of the other’s sexual
orientation may not be easy to draw, but it is an important distinction. The policy
at issue in Saxe did not simply prohibit personal insult or the use of derogatory
epithets, but it could be interpreted to extend to language that simply caused
discomfort for those of a different sexual orientation. The case may not have been
a true circuit split with the West court. It may instead be seen to result from serious
differences between the policies involved.
The next federal appellate court to address the issue, coming back to racial
concerns, was the Sixth Circuit in Castorina ex rel Rewt v. Madison County School
Board.164 The case arose in a Kentucky high school where two students were both
suspended twice for wearing T-shirts decorated with the Confederate flag.165 The
principal determined that the shirts were a violation of a school dress code, which
banned clothing with, among other things, any “illegal, immoral or racist
implication.”166 There may not have been any racist intent on the part of the
students.167 The shirts they wore were commemorative T-shirts from a Hank
Williams, Jr. concert.168 The front of the shirts had an image of the musician while
the back of each shirt had two Confederate flags and the legend “Southern
Thunder.”169 The students said they had worn the shirts to honor the birthday of
Hank Williams, Sr. and to express their Southern heritage.170
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969)).
Id. at 217 (footnote omitted).
246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 538.
Id.
See id. at 539-40.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id.
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In determining whether the school could prohibit the shirt, this court too
looked to Tinker and Fraser.171 The court said that Fraser had not altered Tinker’s
core principles “under which public school may regulate student speech.”172 With
regard to Fraser, the court said that case
concerned a school’s decision to discipline a student after he used “offensively
lewd and indecent speech” . . . . The Court found that this was not protected
speech and that the school had an interest in teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior that provided some room for a school to regulate
173
speech which would otherwise be protected.

It seems an odd reading of Fraser. The speech there did not fall into some
exception to the First Amendment. Rather, the Supreme Court said that the
school’s interest was sufficient to allow regulation.174 Treating the speech in
Fraser as unprotected, however, allowed the court here not to consider any
expansion Fraser may have worked on Tinker.175
This case does point out the difficulty that the Confederate flag may raise. It is
not solely a symbol of hate, as the swastika or a burning cross may be. It is also a
symbol of regional pride in the southern part of the United States. It is true that the
practices of that region were, at the time the flag was officially used, as racist as
they could possibly be. Nonetheless, there are other aspects to that regional pride,
and an appeal to those other aspects may not be an appeal to racist sentiments.
Determining the message behind the wearing or drawing of a Confederate flag may
not be an easy task, and an examination of the activity within the context of any
racial tensions in the school or past use of symbols may be required.176
Another example of the difficulties inherent in determining the meaning of at
least some speech is shown by a Third Circuit case, Sypniewski v. Warren Hills
Regional Board of Education.177 The case arose in a school that had a history of
racial hostility.178 A white student had been suspended for wearing a Halloween
171. See id. at 540.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
175. See Castorina, 246 F.3d at 540. In a later part of the opinion the court provided a better
distinction for Fraser, and one that can stand, even if Fraser is considered an expansion on what may be
limited under Tinker. The court said “a clear underpinning of the Court’s holding in Fraser was the
disruptive nature of the plaintiff’s nominating speech and the fact that the sanctions were not based on
one particular political viewpoint.” Id. at 542 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685). That may bring the facts
of this case, at least as alleged by the students, more in line with Tinker’s concern with viewpoint
discrimination.
176. This issue also arose in Bragg v. Swanson, 371 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D.W. Va. 2005). There, the
court declared unconstitutional a ban on the Confederate flag. Id. at 828-29. It rejected the contention
that the flag is per se patently offensive and noted that “there are a variety of innocent flag uses that
would be silenced by the broadly worded policy. These uses, which would neither be intended, nor
reasonably be conceived, to amount to the advancement or glorification of racism, would nonetheless be
suppressed.” Id. at 827. The court was also unwilling to find a disruption of the educational process,
because of a lack of physical violence, even though there were a number of widely separated racist
incidents. Id. The court also noted a problematic asymmetry in that students were not prohibited from
wearing Malcolm X symbols. Id. at 819.
177. 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
178. See id. at 246-49.

2011]

HATE SPEECH IN THE SCHOOLS

185

costume at school consisting of overalls, a straw hat, “black face” make-up, and a
noose around his neck.179 Students wore Confederate flag clothing, told racist
jokes, and distributed racist material.180 Some students “formed a ‘gang-like’
group known as ‘the Hicks,’ and observed ‘White Power Wednesdays’ by wearing
Confederate flag clothing.”181 On one such Wednesday, a student walked down
one of the school’s main halls waving a large Confederate flag.182
The pattern of racist incidents continued throughout the year.183 It affected
classes as lessons were replaced by discussions of race relations.184 It spilled over
into the community as a white student who associated with black students was
physically threatened at his home.185 Racist graffiti and hostile counter-graffiti
appeared on school walls.186 There was also at least one interracial fight at the
school.187
In response, the school system adopted a policy that barred various sorts of
racial harassment as well as intimidation and expression that created racial hatred,
ill will, and division, and the school provided examples of materials that would
violate the policy, including the Confederate flag.188 It would appear that, given
the background, the policy’s limitations would stand up to scrutiny under Tinker.
The system had a real fear of disruption and concern for the safety of its students,
and the fear would seem real and substantial.
The problem, however, was the target for the suspension at issue: a Jeff
Foxworthy T-shirt.189 Foxworthy, a comedian, is known for his “You might be a
Redneck . . .” routine, in which he recites indications that one might be a
Redneck.190 This shirt was headed “Top 10 reasons you might be a Redneck Sports
Fan,” followed by reasons such as: “Your carpet used to be part of a football field”;
“You know the Hooter’s [sic] menu by heart”; “You think the ‘Bud Bowl’ is real”;
and “You wear a baseball cap to bed.”191 The T-shirt hardly seems racist,
especially when worn by a white student, since the humor is at the expense of
Rednecks. Nevertheless, when the student refused to turn the shirt inside out, he
was suspended for three days.192
When the plaintiff challenged the racial harassment policy, the Third Circuit,
applying Tinker, said that the facts would likely support a ban on the Confederate
flag, but that the flag was not at issue.193 The Foxworthy T-shirt did not have the

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 254.
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history of causing disruption that the flag had.194 In fact, it had been worn to
school before, and there had been no negative reaction.195 Nonetheless, the history
could have reached the shirt. To justify the ban, the school system claimed that the
word “redneck” connotes racial intolerance and that the word is directly associated
with hicks and hence the gang “the Hicks,” which was at the center or the racial
unrest in the high school.196
The court found no basis for any claim that the Hicks ever called themselves
the Rednecks, or that the word “redneck” had been used at the school to harass or
intimidate.197 The court also would not accept an argument that the words were
sufficiently synonymous to allow an acceptable ban on “hicks” to carry over to
“redneck.”198 Synonymy would not suffice.199 The school had over reacted by
trying to limit any reference to poor or farming southerners, rather than limiting
their reaction to more specific references to the school group that had been at the
core of the strife.200
There was a partial concurrence and partial dissent to the majority opinion.201
Judge Rosenn saw sufficient similarity between “redneck” and “hick” as to justify
the ban on the Foxworthy T-shirt.202 More importantly, Judge Rosenn offered a
seemingly broader interpretation of the law. He looked to Fraser, saying:
Under such circumstances as confronted the [School Board], the Supreme Court
has held that officials are not entirely helpless. Even under less disruptive and
racially harassing circumstances than the [Board] confronted, the Court has
recognized the highly appropriate function of public school education “to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.” The Court upheld in
that case a disciplinary rule proscribing “obscene” language and sanctions for a
lewd speech by a high school student. Here, we have obscenities and much more.
The Court in Fraser emphasized the importance of public education to prepare
pupils for citizenship and the “fundamental values of habits and manners of
civility essential to a democratic society [that tolerates] divergent political and
religious views, [but which] also take into account consideration of the
sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow
203
students.”

Even if we need to tolerate such language in the adult world, Judge Rosenn saw the
schools as different.204 To the detriment of the schools, “the majority gives words
of enmity and wickedness at heart in a children’s ambience an unjustifiable sense

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 255.
197. Id. at 256.
198. Id. at 256-57.
199. Id. at 257.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 269 (Rosenn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 273-74.
203. Id. at 272 (citations omitted) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681,
683 (1986)).
204. Id. at 275-76.
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of propriety.”205 For at least this judge, the difference between the schools and the
public marketplace of ideas was a real difference.206
There is an interesting issue over the applicability of this line of cases, from
Tinker right through the hate speech cases, to elementary schools. In S.G. ex rel
A.G. v. Sayreville Board of Education,207 a Kindergarten student was suspended for
telling a friend “I’m going to shoot you” while playing in the school yard during
recess.208 Given the reasonable concerns schools have over violence, even by
young children, the suspension was held not to be a violation of the student’s free
expression rights.209 As the court said, “where the school officials determined that
threats of violence and simulated firearm use were unacceptable, even on the
playground, the balance tilts in favor of the school’s discretionary decisionmaking.”210
What was more interesting was what the court had to say about elementary
schools. Since the court was the same Third Circuit that had found constitutional
violations in Saxe and Sypniewski,211 it might have seemed a good court for the
plaintiff. But, the court noted that none of its cases, nor for that matter the
Supreme Court cases in the area, discussed restrictions at the Kindergarten level.212
The court cited a Seventh Circuit case, Muller ex rel Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse
School,213 for the proposition that Tinker and its progeny are unlikely to apply to
elementary schools.214
It added other quotes and citations for the proposition that elementary schools
are different:
In a recent decision, this court has noted that: ‘any analysis of the students’ rights
to expression on the one hand, and of schools’ need to control behavior and foster
an environment conducive to learning on the other, must necessarily take into
215
account the age and maturity of the student.’”

The court went on: “Various cases have held that ‘[a]ge is a critical factor in
student speech cases,’” quoting again the Seventh Circuit Muller decision, and
adding another Seventh Circuit quote, “age is a relevant factor in assessing the
205. Id. at 275.
206. Even agreeing with Judge Rosenn’s view on Fraser, the majority may have been right in
holding that the shirt should not have been banned. The reference to rednecks does not seem to be the
sort of racially derogatory comment that should be limitable. The case may best be seen a warning of
caution in analyzing the message thought to be racist.
207. 333 F.3d 417 (3rd Cir. 2003).
208. Id. at 418-19.
209. Id. at 423.
210. Id. at 422.
211. See supra notes 145, 177 and accompanying text.
212. S.G. ex rel A.G., 333 F.3d at 422-23.
213. 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996).
214. S.G. ex rel A.G., 333 F.3d at 423. In a non-hate speech context, in which the barred speech was
supportive of acceptance and fair treatment for homosexuals, the court in Gillman v. School Board, 567
F. Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D. Fla. 2008) found no relevance in the fact that the speech could reach elementary
school students because it was not sexual in its nature. Id. at 1374. But, the speech at issue was not hate
speech, so this may not be a position inconsistent with the cases in text.
215. S.G. ex rel A.G., 333 F.3d at 423 (quoting Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416 (3d
Cir. 2003)).
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extent of a student’s free speech rights in school.”216 Returning to its own cases,
the court cited Walker-Serrano v. Leonard217 for its observation that “[t]he
significance of age in this inquiry has called into question the appropriateness of
employing the Tinker framework to assess the constitutionality of restrictions on
the expression of elementary school students.”218
The recognition that the youngest of students require more protection or
somehow merit less freedom of expression is interesting. It is true that the
Supreme Court has noted the particular susceptibility of young children to
influences in some of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.219 Acts that might
not be an establishment of religion when older students are involved may be an
establishment for more impressionable younger students.220 This would seem to
speak not to the student as speaker but to the student as the recipient of expression.
So, why this difference? If the analysis of school hate speech would be limited
to the “substantial disruption” prong of Tinker, the distinction would have to be
based on the difference age could make with regard to that disruption. If the
disruption can only be a physical disruption, younger children seem less likely to
react in such a manner to speech. Particularly, if the concern is over physical
violence, younger children may be less likely to resort to such acts, or at least to do
serious harm. Elementary school children are simply more amenable to control by
school authorities. So, if the focus is solely on physical disruption, the distinction
would seem to cut the other way. The age distinction makes more sense under a
broader understanding of Tinker. If disruption can be found in the psychological
impact of speech and its harmful effects on the ability of the individual to benefit
from education, then elementary school children may well need more protection
than high school students.
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic offer an explanation for this distinction in
arguing that children generally require special protection against hate speech.221
They note that children may be “particularly susceptible to the wounds words can
inflict.”222 It is through hate speech that young minorities come to hate themselves,
as the authors see evidenced by stories of children trying to “scrub the color out of
216. Id. (quoting Baxter ex rel Baxter v. Vigo Cnty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 728 (7th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis in original)).
217. 325 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003).
218. S.G. ex rel A.G., 333 F.3d at 423 (quoting Walker-Serrano, 325 F.3d at 416).
219. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
220. Even with the adoption of the neutrality test, the Court has still recognized that age may make a
difference. In Good News Club v. Milford Central School District, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), the Court
addressed the argument that its earlier decisions regarding the use of facilities in high schools and
universities did not reach allowing the use of a room in an elementary school building for after school
meetings by a Christian group. See id. at 113-19. Rather than simply saying that age now made no
difference, the Court pointed out that the meetings were in a combined high school resource room and
middle school special education room, rather than an elementary classroom. Id. at 118. The Court did
not believe that even small children would perceive an endorsement under the circumstances. Id. In
doing so, it seemed to continue to recognize a difference based on age, even if concluding that in that
case the use of the room was acceptable.
221. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 93-109
(2004).
222. Id. at 93.
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their skin.”223 As they point out, young children have fewer coping mechanisms.224
More damaging still, they may internalize the sentiments expressed. If they
internalize some sense of inferiority, that would have the impact that the Court has
found to be of such great concern.225
There is a distinction between elementary and high school, and it makes sense
to recognize that distinction in the context of hate speech. But if the distinction is
to be recognized, it would seem to be on a broader reading of Tinker. The school
system’s ability to limit hate speech with regard to younger children must be based
on a disruption of the educational process, not a physical disruption but a
psychological disruption. If psychological disruption is sufficient, that would also
seem to have application at the secondary level, even if perhaps the levels of
speech to be tolerated would differ.
There are other cases addressing school hate speech in the post-Fraser era.
These cases moved away from the disturbance aspect of Tinker to recognize a right
on the part of students to be free from hate speech. They are not discussed here but
will be presented later in demonstrating the potential development of a new
approach in this area.226
2. The Fraser Lesson That Could Have Been Drawn
Fraser could have been read to allow school authorities greater leeway in
prohibiting hate speech. The Fraser Court, speaking of the use of sexual metaphor,
said that the speech “[b]y glorifying male sexuality . . . was acutely insulting to
teenage girl students.”227 As with Brown, marginalization, this time of females,
could be seen as having a negative impact on education. The impact of such
speech, and of racist speech, does disrupt the education process and should serve as
a basis, even sticking to the Tinker rationale, for limits on such expression in the
schools. Hate speech, if anything, should be seen as more insulting, and as
intentionally insulting, to its target population. If this “insult[] to teenage girl
students” was sufficient to allow the restriction in Fraser, the greater hostility of
hate speech, and the resulting stronger insult, should be seen as justifying limits.
The Fraser Court went on to say:
The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools
and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Even the most
heated political discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the
228
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.

Here, too, the Court’s language would seem to speak better to hate speech than to
the speech offered by Fraser. Hate speech is, again, more insulting and seemingly
a stronger attack not only on the sensibilities but on the character of its targets.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 95.
Id.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
See infra Part III.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
Id. at 681.
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The Court in Fraser went on to call the inculcation of society’s values “truly
the ‘work of the schools.’”229 Among those values are a commitment to equality
and dignity.230 If the schools are to inculcate these values, then it should be just as
“highly appropriate [a] function of public school education” to prohibit hate speech
in schools as it was to bar the “vulgar and offensive terms” in the speech in
Fraser.231 Fraser recognized that “schools must teach by example the shared
values of a civilized social order” and that teachers and other students are role
models in setting that example.232 “The schools . . . may determine that the
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that
tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct . . . .”233 So also should
the schools be allowed to determine that “the essential lessons of civil conduct and
the inculcation of the shared values of society cannot be conveyed in a school that
tolerates” hate speech.234 Furthermore, the Court’s allowance of restrictions on
speech that is “highly threatening to others” speaks far more strongly to hate
speech than to sexually suggestive speech.235 Whether the girls in the audience
were or were not insulted, they certainly would not have felt as threatened as would
the targets of hate speech.236
Returning to the issue of offensiveness, the Morse Court did discuss the nature
of the sort of speech that could be so considered.237 The school district had argued
that Fraser should be interpreted to allow the suppression of the speech at issue
because it was offensive in the sense used in Fraser. 238 The Court declined stating:

229. Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
230. See id. (“[T]he ‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system’ disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.”).
231. See id.
232. Id. (“Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out
of class.”).
233. Id.
234. Id. A limiting view of Fraser was expressed in Nixon v. Northern Local School District Board
of Education, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005). That court said that Fraser and its progeny “all
deal with speech that is offensive because of the manner in which it is conveyed. . . . Rather than being
concerned with the actual content of what is being conveyed, the Fraser justification for regulating
speech is more concerned with the plainly offensive manner in which it is conveyed.” Id. at 971
(footnote omitted). However, the court cites as examples not just speech containing vulgarity or sexual
innuendo but also “speech that promotes suicide, drugs, alcohol, or murder.” Id. That latter category
would seem clearly content based, and its extension to racism or, in that case, homophobic speech
would not seem a change in type.
A limitation of Fraser to vulgarity, obscenity, and profanity was also noted in Guiles v.
Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006). The importance of this case, however, may be limited. The Tshirt that brought about the school’s action involved a depiction of President George W. Bush as a
chicken-hawk, a depiction that would be protected political speech, combined with references to alcohol
and cocaine and suggesting the president’s former abuse of those substances. See id. at 321. This factor
may have cut the other way, perhaps coming within the scope of Morse.
235. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
236. It is true that the Court went on to discuss cases that recognize the right of the state to limit
children’s access to sexual material, but the more limited scope of the material used to justify the cost
conclusion does not necessarily restrict the scope of the Court’s determination. See id. at 684.
237. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
238. Id.
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We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass
any speech that could fit under some definition of “offensive.” After all, much
political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some. The
concern here is not that Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was
239
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.

Agreeing that Frederick’s speech was offensive would have been stretching the
class of speech Fraser allowed to be suppressed, perhaps beyond the breaking
point. Racist speech, however, can be included in the Fraser concept with far
greater ease. Such speech is easily more offensive than the sexually suggestive, but
not explicit, speech in Fraser.
III. SIGNS OF A NEW DIRECTION
This section will begin with what might seem an odd choice of material, the
discussion of an opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that has been vacated.240 Although the opinion was vacated, it sets out the
arguments that the Supreme Court’s precedents allow limiting hate speech in the
schools in a stronger manner than any of the opinions by other courts.241 It should
be pointed out that the order to vacate was not out of any stated disagreement by
the Supreme Court with the analysis of the Ninth Circuit. Instead it was a
procedural decision. The original opinion had been the appeal of a denial of a
motion for preliminary injunction.242 That denial was upheld, but by the time the
case went on to the Supreme Court, the district court had come to its final
resolution of the case, and the appellate opinion had become moot.243 Thus, the
status of the opinion may prevent it from having value as precedent, but it still has
whatever intellectual strength the reader thinks it demonstrates.
The case, Harper v. Poway Unified School District, was a split decision, with a
majority decision by Judge Reinhardt and an interesting dissent by Judge
Kozinski.244 It was not another Confederate flag case but involved T-shirts, in a
high school, that condemned other students on the basis of their sexual
orientation.245
There had been a history of conflict over issues of sexual orientation at Poway
High School.246 As a way to further tolerance, the school allowed a group called
the Gay-Straight Alliance to hold a “Day of Silence.”247 The day was not
239.
240.
(2007).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). vacated, 549 U.S. 1262
See id. at 1178.
Id. at 1173.
See Harper, 549 U.S. 1262.
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1167; see also id. at 1192 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1171 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. The court explained the day’s activities as follows:
On the “Day of Silence,” participating students wore duct tape over their mouths to
symbolize the silencing effect of intolerance upon gays and lesbians; these students
would not speak in class except through a designated representative. Some students
wore black T-shirts that said “National Day of Silence” and contained a purple square
with a yellow equal sign in the middle. The Gay-Straight Alliance, with the permission
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uniformly well received.248 There was a series of incidents, including antihomosexual comments and altercations, with the altercations leading to
suspensions.249 A week after the “Day of Silence” another group of students
organized a “Straight-Pride Day.”250 The message of tolerance was replaced by Tshirts with comments derogatory toward homosexuals, leading to more
altercations.251
The next year, a second “Day of Silence” was planned after the Gay-Straight
Alliance met with the principal to seek ways to reduce tensions and possible
altercations.252 On the “Second Day of Silence,” the plaintiff, who believed the
real purpose of the day was to promote homosexual activity, wore a T-shirt with “I
Will Not Accept What God Has Condemned,” handwritten on the front and
“Homosexuality Is Shameful ‘Romans 1:27’” handwritten on the back.253 The next
day he came to school in a T-shirt with “Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced What
God Has Condemned” handwritten on the front and the same legend as on the prior
day on the back.254
On that second day, a teacher noticed several students in class talking about
the shirt.255 Now noticing the shirt, the teacher told the plaintiff that he believed it
to be inflammatory and, concerned about the prior year’s altercations, sent the
plaintiff to the office for violating the school’s dress code.256 The principal decided
that, given the conflicts of the previous year, he would not let the student wear
what he interpreted as an inflammatory T-shirt on campus.257 The student was
given the opportunity to remove the shirt and return to class but refused.258 The
student asked to be suspended, but instead the principal simply kept him in the
office the rest of the day, with no suspension and no disciplinary record.259
The student filed suit alleging a number of constitutional violations under the
rights to free speech and free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as well as a claim under state
of the School, also put up several posters promoting awareness of harassment on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Id. at 1171 n.3.
248. Id. at 1171.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1171-72. School rules included a provision regarding dress, setting out examples of what
was considered unacceptable, including “[c]lothing and accessories (including backpacks) that promote
or portray . . . [v]iolence or hate behavior including derogatory connotations directed toward sexual
identity.” Id. at 1203 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1172 (majority opinion). The court also noted that there had been a successful law suit
against the school on the part of two students who complained that the school had failed to protect them
from harassment based on their sexual orientation. Id. at 1172 n.6 (citation to footnote only). The trial
record further supported concerns about confrontations, since one of the students testified to having
been called names, being shoved in the halls, having had food thrown at him, and having been spat on.
Id.
258. Id. at 1172.
259. Id.
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law.260 The district court dismissed all but the speech and religion claims and with
regard to those claims refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the
school.261 It was the plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal of that denial that reached the
Ninth Circuit.262
The basis for the district court’s denial of the injunction, and one that the
appellate court could have quite easily and simply affirmed, was that the school,
under Tinker, had a sufficient basis to predict a substantial disruption of and
interference with the educational mission.263 Given the history surrounding the
“Day of Silence” in the previous year and the ongoing conflict in the schools,
surely Tinker would permit this limit on student speech. Rather than affirming on
that basis, however, the Ninth Circuit based its decision on a different part of the
rule derived from Tinker.264
The court used the second aspect of the Tinker test, looking to whether the
speech activity the school sought to suppress “‘intrudes upon . . . the rights of other
students’ or ‘colli[des] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone.’”265 The court said that the wearing of the T-shirt collided with the rights of
other students in a fundamental way.266 The court stated:
Public school students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core
identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have a right
to be free from such attacks while on school campuses. As Tinker clearly states,
students have the right to “be secure and to be let alone.” Being secure involves
not only freedom from physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause
young people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in society. . . .
Speech that attacks high school students who are members of minority groups that
have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and physical abuse, and made
to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as to damage their
267
sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to learn.

The court went on to note that the impact is not only on psychological health and
well-being but on educational development as well.268 School administrators do
not have to tolerate this, and the court concluded that the school had a right to bar
260. Id. at 1173.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1183-84.
264. See id. at 1177-80. The appellate court also rejected the plaintiff/appellant’s claims based on the
religion clauses of the First Amendment. See id. at 1186-91. That subject is beyond the scope of this
work and will not be addressed. The topic is, however, addressed in Kristi L. Bowman, Public School
Student’s Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2007). Professor
Bowman sees little reason to believe that the Supreme Court will resort to a free exercise analysis when
it comes to in-school hate speech. Id. at 196-97.
265. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
508 (1969)).
266. Id. at 1778.
267. Id. (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 1179. For additional material on the impact of hate speech and on bullying in general, see,
e.g., Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004); Amy Lovell,
“Other Students Always Used to Say, ‘Look at the Dykes’”: Protecting Students from Peer Sexual
Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 617 (1998).
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the T-shirt in question on the ground that it was “injurious to gay and lesbian
students and interfered with their right to learn.”269
Addressing the treatment of this prong of Tinker in Saxe, the court argued that
Saxe had conflated the two prongs of Tinker.270 That court had only briefly alluded
to interference with the rights of others, and in the view of the Harper court had,
“suggest[ed], perhaps inadvertently, that injurious slurs may not be prohibited
unless they also cause substantial disruption.”271 “That,” the Harper court said,
“clearly is not the case. The two Tinker prongs are stated in the alternative.”272
The court wanted to make clear the limitations of its decision. It does not
reach limitations on political debate, the sort of speech that was at issue in Tinker.
While the court recognized that there is political disagreement over homosexual
acts and rights in the United States, it noted that there had been similar
disagreement over racial equality and religion.273 Just as that disagreement should
not require allowing students to wear shirts declaring the inferiority of racial
minorities or suggesting a less than pleasant after-life for religious minorities,
homosexuals should be similarly protected.274 There may be a right to raise
political issues, but “[i]t is not necessary to do so by directly condemning, to their
faces, young students trying to obtain a fair and full education in our public
schools.”275 More generally:
It is essential that students have the opportunity to engage in full and open political
expression, both in and out of the school environment. . . . Limitations on student
speech must be narrow, and applied with sensitivity and for reasons that are
consistent with the fundamental First Amendment mandate. Accordingly, we limit
our holding to instances of derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students’
276
minority status such as race, religion, and sexual orientation.

The court went on to address a concern raised by the dissent that the holding
does not reach offensive words directed at majority groups.277 In response, the
court noted a difference between historically oppressed minorities and those groups
that have enjoyed a privileged social, economic, and political status.278 “Growing
up as a member of a minority group often carries with it psychological and
emotional burdens not incurred by members of the majority.”279 Verbal assaults
against members of majority groups may still be barred by Tinker, but not because
of their psychological impact.280 They are, the court said, more likely to be justified
by Tinker’s concern over substantial disruption or Fraser’s allowance of a ban on

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Harper, 445 F.3d at 1180.
Id. at 1179-80 n.21.
Id. at 1180 n.21 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id. at 1181.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1183 n.28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plainly offensive speech.281 Even so, the court left open “the possibility that some
verbal assaults on the core characteristics of majority high school students would
merit application of the Tinker “intrusion upon the rights of other students”
prong.282
The court also considered the objection that, since the T-shirt was worn in
response to the “Day of Silence,” the ban was a form of viewpoint discrimination.
The court stated:
[P]ublic schools may permit, and even encourage, discussions of tolerance,
equality and democracy without being required to provide equal time for student
or other speech espousing intolerance, bigotry or hatred. . . . [B]ecause a school
sponsors a “Day of Religious Tolerance,” it need not permit its students to wear Tshirts reading, “Jews Are Christ-Killers” or “All Muslims Are Evil Doers.” . . .
Similarly, a school that permits a “Day of Racial Tolerance,” may restrict a student
from displaying a swastika or a Confederate Flag. In sum, a school has the right to
teach civic responsibility and tolerance as part of its basic educational mission; it
need not as a quid pro quo permit hateful and injurious speech that runs counter to
283
that mission.

While a response to an argument for tolerance may have to be allowed, that
response may not take the ad hominem form that occurred here.284 That response
should be an argument against toleration rather than an attack on those the speaker
would prefer not to tolerate.285
A dissent by Judge Kozinski argued that the school had offered no lawful
justification for banning the T-shirts in question.286 He did not even find a basis in
Tinker’s concern over disruption, considering the evidence inadequate.287 Evidence
that in the previous year, when shirts with inflammatory messages and derogatory
remarks had been worn, there were physical altercations would not do.288 Judge
Kozinski found it unclear from the record that the messages on the shirts were
involved in the prior year’s altercations.289 He also said that the record did not
indicate how close the messages on last year’s shirts were to those on the plaintiff’s
shirts, nor did it indicate how the shirts and other events may have interacted last
year to cause the results.290
Turning to the “rights of others” language in Tinker, Judge Kozinski was of the
view that the phrase “can only refer to traditional rights, such as those against
assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1183-84 n.28. It may be more common that the messages the majority finds objectionable
are political rather than personal. For example, in Gillman v. School Board, 567 F.Supp. 2d 1359 (N.D.
Fla. 2008), a school principal had barred clothing and buttons that advocated accepting and fairly
treating homosexuals. Id. at 1363. While those messages seem to have been offensive to the principal’s
religious views, they were political and not a personal attack on anyone. Id. at 1370.
283. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185-86 (citations omitted).
284. See id. at 1186.
285. See id.
286. Id. at 1192 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 1193-96.
288. Id. at 1194-95.
289. Id. at 1195.
290. Id.
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with the First Amendment is well established.”291 He disputed the majority’s
conclusion that the shirts violated the rights of others by disparaging their
homosexual status to the extent that they interfere with the right to partake in the
educational process.292
What may be most interesting, however, about the dissent are the comments
expressing some concern about the state of the law. Looking at the two most
relevant Supreme Court cases, Judge Kozinski said:
Reconciling Tinker and Fraser is no easy task. The Supreme Court majority in
Fraser seems to have been influenced by the indecorousness of Fraser’s
comments, which referred to a fellow student in terms that could be understood as
a thinly-veiled phallic metaphor. The curious thing, though, is that Fraser used no
dirty words, so his speech could only have been offensive on account of the ideas
he conveyed—the ideas embodied in his elaborate double-entendre. So construed,
however, Fraser swallows up Tinker, by suggesting that some ideas can be
excluded from the high school environment, even if they don’t meet the Tinker
293
standard.

That is the position argued for here in the discussion of Fraser.294 It was not an
argument that Fraser has swallowed up Tinker, but that Tinker may be limited to
cases in which the school suppresses one side of a real political debate in the adult
community.295 In Harper, the T-shirts were not a part of the political debate but
invective against students on one side. Fraser also allows the limitation of certain
language that is broad enough to include that offered here. It does not suggest that
certain ideas may be excluded, but certain language may be. Fraser could express
his belief that his candidate was the best for the office, but his sexual metaphor was
out of bounds. Harper could argue that society should not value tolerance, but that
was not an excuse for using insults.296
291. Id. at 1198.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1193 n.1 (citation omitted) (citation to footnote only).
294. See supra Part II.B.2.
295. See supra Part II.B.2.
296. Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007), provides a recent example of
the sort of reaction that should be protected. A couple of students, believing that the faculty,
administration, and other students were prejudiced against conservatives and conservative views and
that a forum for conservative views was lacking at the school, formed the Hudson High School
Conservative Club. Id. at 172. They found a faculty sponsor and were formally recognized. Id. They
also affiliated with the national organization High School Conservative Clubs of America (“HSCCA”).
Id. The school was “one of only eleven pilot schools selected to participate in the ‘First Amendment
Schools’ program, a national initiative designed to transform the way in which schools teach the rights
and responsibilities of democratic citizenship.” Id. The principal seemed receptive and told the students
that he was pleased that they were getting politically involved. Id.
The problem arose when the students put up ten posters advertising their first meeting. Id. at
173. The posters included the web address of the HSCCA. Id. A faculty member checked the web site
and found links to video footage of beheadings by Islamist terrorists. Id. There was a warning by the
link that the material available there was extremely graphic. Id. The posters were removed, and the
assistant principal explained the reasons to the students. Id. He said that the HSCCA was anti-gay and
promoted violence, and that the web site had links to the beheadings. Id. He also said that
many of the teachers were offended by the content of the HSCCA website such as (1)
calls to take down the rainbow (gay rights) flag and put up the American flag, (2) the
website’s support for the Second Amendment, (3) the inclusion of a “12-Step Liberal
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Also of interest is Judge Kozinski’s conclusion, in which he shows that he
recognizes the concerns of the school authorities and of the majority. It is worth
setting out at length:
I acknowledge that the school authorities here found themselves in a difficult
situation and, in light of the circumstances, acted well . . . .
I also have sympathy for defendants’ position that students in school are a
captive audience and should not be forced to endure speech that they find
offensive and demeaning. There is surely something to the notion that a Jewish
student might not be able to devote his full attention to school activities if the
fellow in the seat next to him is wearing a t-shirt with the message “Hitler Had the
Right Idea” in front and “Let’s Finish the Job!” on the back. This t-shirt may well
interfere with the educational experience even if the two students never come to
blows or even have words about it.
Perhaps school authorities should have greater latitude to control student
speech than allowed them by Justice Fortas’s Vietnam-era opinion in Tinker. . . .
Perhaps the narrow exceptions of Tinker should be broadened and multiplied.
Perhaps Tinker should be overruled. But that is a job for the Supreme Court, not
for us. While I sympathize with my colleagues’ effort to tinker with the law in this
area, I am not convinced we have the authority to do so, which is why I must
297
respectfully dissent.

Judge Kozinski seems to have been unable to accept that there may have been a
legal basis for the majority’s results, while agreeing that perhaps that result ought
to be the law.
While the court’s analysis was based on Tinker, an analysis based on Fraser
would certainly come to the same result as the majority view in Harper.298 The
Recovery Program,” and (4) its position in favor of abolishing the national education
association (“NEA”).
Id. at 174.
If that had been the basis for removing the posters, then it would have reached political speech
that should be protected. Instead, the school relied on the violent nature of the accessible videos. Id. at
177. The court rejected that basis, noting that the web sites would be accessed outside of school and
only by those choosing to do so—the site had been blocked on the school’s computer, but that had not
been challenged. Id. at 177-78. It also noted the Harper decision and said that if, after the vacation of
the opinion, had it been good law, it still would not have applied, since that opinion addressed only
material that was derogatory or injurious to minorities. Id. at 179. The court ruled that the students had
a right to put up the posters with the URL of the HSCCA. Id. at 180.
The point is that the comments about the rainbow flag were political commentary. They were
not personal attacks on gay students but were instead directed against the political agenda symbolized
by that flag. The system seemed to know that it could not rely on the grounds presented by the assistant
principal. Further, the court did not discuss any concerns over these comments being an attack on
homosexual students, even when it discussed Harper’s application to the videos. Id. at 179-80.
297. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
298. In DePinto v. Bayonne Board of Education, 514 F. Supp. 2d 633 (D.N.J. 2007), the court
suggested at least the potential for this approach. The case involved students who were protesting the
imposition of a school uniform rule at their elementary school. Id. at 636. They wore buttons with what
appeared to be a photo of members of the Hitler Youth with a slashed red circle and the legend “No
School Uniforms.” Id. The photo did not contain any visible swastikas, and the people in the photo
were not engaged in the Nazi salute, but it seems that it was uncontested that those depicted were Hitler
Youth. Id. The district sent home letters to the students’ parents saying that the background image was
objectionable to many of the school district’s citizens and that their attorney had told them that the
buttons did not constitute free speech. Id.
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Harper majority’s expression of the concerns, and even some of the concern
expressed by the dissent, could hardly be improved upon. Under either approach,
there is the recognition that students may be sufficiently impacted as to allow limits
on hate speech. It may be sufficient to affect the rights of the target students to
receive an education, and it would seem that it would come within the Fraser
concerns over schools teaching civility. Either way, minorities would be protected
from hate speech in the schools.
The use of Fraser in this context, rather than the Harper court’s use of Tinker,
gains support from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Scott v. School Board.299 The
issue was, once again, a student suspension for displaying the Confederate flag.300
The Eleventh Circuit held that the ban was not a violation of the student’s free
expression rights and did so without laying out a basis of a showing of real concern
over material and substantial disruption.301 The court noted that the freedom of
expression “stands against the unique backdrop of a public school.”302 While
students do not lose their First Amendment freedoms at the school house door,
“those rights should not interfere with a school administrator’s professional
observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could lead to, an
unhealthy and potentially unsafe learning environment for the children they
serve.”303
An unhealthy environment, as distinguished from an unsafe
environment, does not seem to require the fear of a substantial disturbance that
Tinker may be seen to envision. Psychological impact may well be sufficient.
Rather than supply its own analysis, the court adopted the reasoning of the
district judge. The district judge recognized, in addition to the authority to limit
appreciably disruptive speech, that
from Fraser, even if disruption is not immediately likely, school officials are

Once the school district got to court, it found out that the attorney was wrong, and the court
issued a preliminary injunction against the ban on the buttons. Id. at 650. Given the political nature of
the message, it seems the correct decision. The buttons expressed disagreement with a school policy,
clearly a valid political issue in the community. They were not supportive of Nazis but instead
suggested that the imposition of uniforms would be the sort of regimentation on which the Nazi regime
was built.
The school system had failed to recognize that subtlety and argued that, under Fraser, the photo
was lewd, vulgar, indecent or plainly offensive. Id. at 640. The court disagreed but said:
This Court does not, and need not, address the more difficult case of a student who wears
or displays obvious symbols of hate or racial divisiveness. If the student in this case had
displayed a swastika, a confederate flag, or a burning cross, then this Court’s analysis
would differ greatly. While it is unclear whether this Court would so find under Tinker
or Fraser (it is eminently more likely that such a symbol would create a disturbance
under Tinker), this Court believes that such a display would likely be “plainly offensive”
under Fraser; however, the resolution of that dispute is not before this Court.
Id. at 644 n.7 (citation to footnote only). Thus, at least this court would seem to take the position that
the sort of analysis the Ninth Circuit’s vacated opinion applied under its view of Tinker could be applied
under Fraser instead. It would not seem that the symbols of Nazism could be unique in this regard, and
presumably the court would extend that potential analysis to hate speech more generally.
299. 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
300. Id. at 1247.
301. Id. at 1249.
302. Id. at 1247.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
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charged with the duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values
conducive both to happiness and to the practice of self-government.” To do so,
they must have the flexibility to control the tenor and contours of student speech
within school walls or on school property, even if such speech does not result in a
304
reasonable fear of immediate disruption.

Recognizing that Fraser allows the restriction of vulgar and offensive words, the
court determined that the real issue was whether the display of the Confederate flag
was vulgar and offensive.305 That issue is the subject of debate. For some, as the
court recognized, the flag is a historical symbol that conveys certain philosophical
and political views revolving not around slavery but around states’ rights.306 To
others, it is nothing more than a symbol of racism. The court said that even the
terms of the debate,
[w]ords like “symbol”, “heritage”, “racism”, “power”, “slavery”, and “white
supremacy” are highly emotionally charged and reveal that for many, perhaps
most, this is not merely an intellectual discourse. Real feelings—strong feelings—
are involved. It is not only constitutionally allowable for school officials to
closely contour the range of expression children are permitted regarding such
307
volatile issues, it is their duty to do so.

The court said that a part of the school’s mission is to teach its students to engage
each other in civil terms, not in words that are highly offensive to others.308 Where
a symbol is so associated with racism that it will provoke ill will and hatred, the
school may take action.309
Just one more case shows that more courts seem to be coming to recognize this
right of school authorities to protect their minority students from derogatory
comments. In Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204 Board of
Education,310 the court considered another case growing out of a “Day of Silence.”
The day had been celebrated at the high school for several years, sponsored by the
Gay/Straight Alliance.311 Some of the students wore labels indicating their
participation and remained silent during the day, except when required to speak in
class or to a member of the staff.312 Some of the students and staff wore shirts
bearing the message “Be Who You Are.”313
304. Id. at 1248 (citation omitted).
305. Id. at 1248-49.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1249. The Eleventh Circuit quoted this language in its 2006 decision White v. Nich, No.
05-15064, 2006 WL 1594213, at *2. This case again concerned a challenge to a ban on clothing bearing
a Confederate flag. Id. at *1. The court said the student speech can be restricted on the basis of either
Tinker or, even in the absence of showing a likely disruption, on the basis of the school system’s
responsibility to develop good citizenship, found in Fraser. Id.
308. Scott v. School Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).
309. Id. Interestingly, having set out such a Fraser based rationale, the court then added that there
had been a history of racial tension and fights. Id. Thus, the court said, the ban could be justified under
Fraser or Tinker. Id.
310. 619 F. Supp. 2d 517 (N.D. Ill. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204,
523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir., 2008).
311. Id. at 520.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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The legal issue arose when a student group wanted to hold a “Day of Truth”
the day after the “Day of Silence.”314 The school agreed that they could do so on
the same basis as the previous day.315 They could remain silent and could display
pins, shirts, and the like with a message of “Be Happy, Be Straight” or “Straight
Alliance.”316 A student who professed religious beliefs against homosexuality
went beyond these messages and wore a T-shirt that had “My Day Of Silence,
Straight Alliance” on the front and “Be Happy, Not Gay” on the back.317 School
officials made the student black out the “Not Gay” portion of the message.318 The
case went to court seeking damages for that action and an injunction against future
similar actions.319
The court found no violation of the student’s constitutional rights.320 The court
said “school officials may prohibit a public high school student from displaying
negative statements about a category of persons, including homosexuals, that are
inconsistent with the school’s educational goal of promoting tolerance.”321 The
court distinguished the message displayed from the message “Be Happy, Be
Straight.” The latter was said to be a positive statement about being straight, not a
directly negative comment about being gay.322 If school officials had prevented
that positive statement, as alleged, there would have been a violation.323 “Since, on
the previous day students were permitted to display messages supporting being
homosexual, the next day’s suppression of a message supporting being
heterosexual should be understood as viewpoint discrimination . . . .”324
The trial court’s denial of an injunction was appealed to the Seventh Circuit as
Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District,325 and the appellate court,
with Judge Posner writing, ruled that the injunction should have been granted.326
Interestingly, however, the disagreement between the courts was over application,

314. Id. This was by no means the first case raising the issue of straight pride messages. In
Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F .Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Minn. 2001), a student wore a straight pride sweatshirt
to which some of the students took offense. Id. at 1069. There was some evidence of “gay-bashing,”
but, it was unclear to the court if the principal could establish a reasonable likelihood of a substantial
disruption. Id. at 1072. The issue is a bit confused, because while there had been a number of fights,
they appear to revolve around issues of race, rather than sexual orientation. Id.
315. Zamecnik, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 526.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 521.
320. Id. at 527. The court did indicate that, if the school had prevented her from replacing “NOT
GAY” with “BE STRAIGHT,” that that would be a violation. Id. at 528. The facts on that issue seemed
unclear.
321. Id. at 527. Indeed, where the message is particularly strong, a school system could face liability
for failure to act. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003), allowed
a suit by homosexual students to proceed, finding that there might be sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that the school had been deliberately indifferent to student-to-student anti-homosexual
harassment. Id. at 1135.
322. Zamecnik, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
323. Id. at 528.
324. Id.
325. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
326. Id. at 676.
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rather than theory.327 As to application, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
expression “Be Happy, Not Gay” could be seen as a play on words since “gay” is
not only a word indicating homosexual orientation but also a synonym of
“happy.”328 The court also concluded that the comment might not even be seen as
derogatory since it really said no more than the “Be Happy, Be Straight” shirt that
the school would allow.329 While there may be a strong nonpropositional
difference between two sentences seemingly making the same point, the “Be
Happy, Not Gay” shirt was not seen as an offensive way to say the same thing as a
“Be Happy, Be Straight” shirt.330 In this court’s view, “Be Happy, Not Gay” “is
only tepidly negative; ‘derogatory’ or ‘demeaning’ seems too strong a
characterization.”331 It was, at any rate, seen as “highly speculative” that the shirt
in question would “poison the educational atmosphere.”332
The plaintiff’s success on appeal was only partial. The Seventh Circuit refused
to enjoin more generally the enforcement of the school’s rule, and much of the
court’s analysis in that regard agreed with the position taken by the district court
and espoused here.333 The Seventh Circuit sided with the right of the schools to
place some limits on student speech that stretched beyond the lewd speech of
Fraser or the drug oriented speech of Morse.334 The court stated:
A heavy federal constitutional hand on the regulation of student speech by school
authorities would make little sense. The contribution that kids can make to the
marketplace in ideas and opinions is modest and a school’s countervailing interest
in protecting its students from offensive speech by their classmates is undeniable.
Granted, because 18-year-olds can now vote, high-school students should not be
“raised in an intellectual bubble,” . . . which would be the effect of forbidding all
discussion of public issues by such students. But Neuqua Valley High School has
not tried to do that. It has prohibited only (1) derogatory comments on (2)
unalterable or otherwise deeply rooted personal characteristics about which most
people, including--perhaps especially including--adolescent schoolchildren, are
highly sensitive. People are easily upset by comments about their race, sex, etc.,
including their sexual orientation, because for most people these are major
components of their personal identity—none more so than a sexual orientation that
deviates from the norm. Such comments can strike a person at the core of his
335
being.

The court recognized that there was evidence that at least suggested that
“adolescent students subjected to derogatory comments about such characteristics
may find it even harder than usual to concentrate on their studies and perform up to
the school’s expectations.”336 And, in a statement that is very important for the
327. See id. at 675-76.
328. Id. at 675.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 676.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 675.
334. Id. at 674.
335. Id. at 671 (citation omitted).
336. Id. (citing David M. Huebner et al., Experiences of Harassment, Discrimination, and Physical
Violence Among Young Gay and Bisexual Men, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1200, 1200-01 (2004);
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position argued for here, the court said “[m]utual respect and forbearance enforced
by the school may well be essential to the maintenance of a minimally decorous
atmosphere for learning.”337
Bringing Supreme Court case law to bear, the court noted the need for a
realistic fear of a substantial disruption before the school can limit student speech;
but the court said that concern is not limited to avoiding violence.338 That was not,
after all, the concern in either Fraser or Morse. The Seventh Circuit’s reading of
those cases led to the conclusion that “if there is reason to think that a particular
type of student speech will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in
truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of substantial
disruption—the school can forbid the speech.”339 While the application of the rule
to the shirt at issue may have been flawed, the rule itself “seeks to maintain a
civilized school environment conducive to learning, and it does so in an evenhanded way. . . . The list of protected characteristics in the rule appears to cover
the full spectrum of highly sensitive personal-identity characteristics.”340
IV. THE IMPACT OF MORSE
It seems clear that Morse should be read to allow restrictions of student speech
when the speech presents some danger to student welfare. Justice Alito, in his
necessary concurrence, showed concern over the dangers found in drug use.341
While he would not allow the suppression of all speech that interfered with the
educational mission of the school, fearing that such a standard would allow the
schools to suppress political and social views contrary to those they considered part
of the educational mission, drugs presented a danger.342
If Justice Alito’s concurrence is intended only to state that Morse does not
represent a wide-spread broadening of authority on the part of schools to limit
student speech beyond that in Tinker and its progeny, adding only a category for
speech that is dangerous to students, it must still be remembered that those cases
should be seen to support the suppression of hate speech. Further, the dangers on
which Justice Alito relied might be argued to include psychological and emotional
harm,343 which is, after all, a significant portion of the danger to be found in drug
use.
Professor Emily Gold Waldman has examined hateful or hurtful student
MICHAEL BOCHENEK & A. WIDNEY BROWN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS:
VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN
U.S. SCHOOLS 1-3 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm; AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING,
TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 37 (Jodi Lipson ed., 2001), available at
http://www.aauw.org/ learn/research/upload/hostilehallways.pdf.).
337. Id. at 672.
338. Id. at 674.
339. Id.
340. Id. (citation omitted).
341. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
342. Id. at 423-25.
343. See Francisco M. Negron, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards a “New”
Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1231-32
(2009) (noting that some courts have gone beyond physical danger to include this sort of harm).
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speech in a post-Morse world.344 She divides such speech into two categories,
distinguishing between speech that identifies and attacks particular students and
speech expressing political, social, or religious viewpoints, without such a
particularized focus, and says that the Supreme Court cases indicate that the first
category should still potentially be subject to regulation.345 The distinction clearly
comports with Justice Alito’s distinction between the banner in Morse and political
speech. Waldman argues that speech that attacks students is similar to the “Bong
Hits 4 Jesus” banner in that both endanger student safety.346 While she suggests
that any link between the banner and drug use was weak, “students subjected to
name-calling or other forms of verbal victimization ‘feel more depressed, anxious,
and lonely than students who do not view themselves as frequent targets.’ This
psychological distress . . . can lead to physical illnesses . . . . suicidal ideation” and
“violent behavior by victimized students.”347
Expanding on this distinction between speech that attacks and political speech,
she says:
[S]uch ad hominem speech—for example, derogatory remarks about another
student’s appearance, clothing, or personality—will lack any political content at
all, just like Frederick’s banner. And even when such speech does possess some
degree of political content—such as disparagement of a student for his sexual
orientation or religion—the political aspect of the speech and the ad hominem
aspect can largely be decoupled. To put it bluntly, a student could express his
belief that Jesus Christ is the only path to salvation, or that homosexuality is sinful,
without singling out non-Christian or gay students and telling them that they are
348
going to Hell or calling them derogatory names.

She also notes that this distinction is consistent with the statement in Fraser that it
is a proper function of schools to teach shared values and civility and seems to
agree with the arguments presented349 that limits on hate speech are consistent with
Fraser.350
Waldman goes on, however, to include a statement such as “homosexuality is
shameful” as expressing a general political, social or religious view with real
political content.351 Under that concession, a restriction would be justified only if it
presented a substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others. She notes that
[the] courts are unsettled as to whether (1) the “substantial disruption” prong can
be satisfied by substantial disruption of a single student’s educational experience,
as opposed to a more widespread disruption; and (2) the “invasion of rights” prong
can be satisfied in cases where the student speech does not fall into a traditional
352
tort category like defamation.

344. See Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially Hurtful Speech
(Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463 (2008).
345. Id. at 492.
346. Id. at 492-93.
347. Id. at 493.
348. Id. at 494-95 (citation omitted).
349. See supra Part II.B.2.
350. Waldman, supra note 344, at 495.
351. Id. at 497.
352. Id. at 498.
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On the first issue, Waldman draws guidance from Judge Alito’s opinion in Saxe,
contending that the disruption of even one student’s education provides sufficient
justification for limiting student speech.353 On the second issue, she argues that the
school’s ability to step in should not be limited to situations in which they must
intervene.354 She seems, then, to see little change resulting from Morse, so long as
the speech involved is properly analyzed.355
Mark Cordes has also examined the impact of Morse.356 He sees no significant
erosion in student speech rights and finds, in Justice Alito’s concurrence, a
distinction between speech that is at the core of the First Amendment and that
deserving less protection.357 Political speech, clearly core speech, can be
suppressed only with a particularly strong showing.358 With regard to hate speech,
Cordes says
[then] Judge Alito’s analysis [in Saxe] strongly suggests that even derogatory and
negative speech that might comment on characteristics of a group identity is
protected to the extent it involves core religions or religious speech, or involves
commentary on social issues . . . . [However,] particularly severe or pervasive
359
speech might not be protected . . . .

353. See id. at 499.
354. See id. at 500.
355. Waldman argues that the court in Nuxoll, a post-Morse case, struck the right balance:
It read Morse, as I do, as suggesting that “if there is reason to think that a particular type
of student speech that will lead to a decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in truancy,
or other symptoms of a sick school—symptoms therefore of substantial disruption—the
school can forbid the speech.” It concluded that the school rule satisfied this test, by
prohibiting derogatory remarks about “unalterable or otherwise deeply rooted personal
characteristics about which most people, including—perhaps especially including—
adolescent schoolchildren, are highly sensitive.” Nonetheless, the court concluded that
the application of the rule to this particular T-shirt was unconstitutional, because the “Be
Happy, Not Gay” slogan was only “tepidly negative” rather than truly derogatory, and
there was no real showing that the T-shirt would “poison the educational atmosphere.”
Id. at 501-502 (footnotes omitted). While Waldman agrees with the court’s conclusion, she says she
would take a slightly different approach, first asking whether the attack was personally directed and then
looking to interference. Id. at 502. For a discussion of Nuxoll, see supra notes 325-40 and
accompanying text.
Rather than concluding that the shirt was not personally directed, it might simply be argued that
the shirt was not an attack. That really seems to be the Nuxoll court’s conclusion. If Waldman is
suggesting that the shirt would actually have to name an individual student to be a personal attack, that
would seem too restrictive. If the shirt had been more strongly worded, the court would have allowed
the restriction. It was simply too “tepid” to qualify for sanction.
356. See Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2009).
357. See id. at 672-74.
358. See id. at 673-75.
359. Id. at 709. Professor Cordes is critical of the decision by the Sixth Circuit in Boroff v. Van Wert
City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). Cordes, supra note 356, at 702. That pre-Morse
case invoked destructive values as a basis for regulation, combined with a broad reading of Fraser. The
case was brought when a high school student was not allowed to wear a Marilyn Manson T-shirt to
school. Boroff, 220 F.3d at 467. The principal said that the lines in Manson’s songs that might be seen
as advocating suicide or promoting drugs and Manson’s pro-drug persona were contrary to the school’s
mission of establishing core values of human dignity, self-respect and responsibility. Id. at 470. The
court said that “where Boroff’s T-shirts contain symbols and words that promote values that are so
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Perhaps, again, that should come down to a distinction between stating a belief that
homosexual activity is sinful and comments derogatory toward those of a
homosexual orientation. The first is religious or political, while the second is
purely derogatory.360
The Alito concurrence in Morse should not be seen as working any real change
to the position derived from Tinker and Fraser. It was, after all, Justice Alito’s
purpose in writing his concurrence to emphasize that he did “not read the opinion
to mean that there are necessarily any grounds for such regulation that are not
already recognized in the holdings of this Court.”361 The arguments herein have
been directed toward demonstrating that limitations on hate speech may be justified
by the very holdings of the Court that Justice Alito wants to emphasize have not
been expanded. Furthermore, his assertion that there are not “necessarily” any
grounds for expanding restrictions beyond those already recognized falls short of
saying that there can be no such grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
It may be that, either under analysis based on Fraser or on the second prong of
Tinker, the nation is coming to the realization that school children need to be
protected from hate speech. Children may be coming to receive the protection they
need in school to thrive. Only in an atmosphere in which their dignity and equality
are recognized can children obtain the sort of education to which they are entitled.
Speech that impugns that dignity and equality, speech that is degrading on the basis
of their race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation ought to be limited by the
school authorities. The schools are left with only two choices: They allow the
patently contrary to the school’s educational mission, the School has the authority, under the
circumstances of this case, to prohibit those T-shirts.” Id. at 470.
Cordes said that to the extent that the opinion suggests that a school can ban a T-shirt simply
because it promotes values that run contrary to the educational mission of the school, it is inconsistent
with Morse. Cordes, supra note 356, at 702. He does say, however, that the speech involved was not
core speech and that, in fact, the lyrics of some Marilyn Manson songs could be held to present a
danger. Id. He states:
If the shirts are reasonably understood to represent the lyrics, they can arguably be
banned, not because the messages are a contrary to a school’s educational mission of
promoting human dignity and respect for others, but because the message reflected in
many of the group’s lyrics pose a very real threat to schools.
Id.
360. Michael Kent Curtis discusses this distinction and finds it lacking in appeal. See Michael Kent
Curtis, Be Careful What You Wish for: Gays, Dueling High School T-Shirts, and the Perils of
Suppression, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 431 (2009). Curtis states:
Some religious students, of course, insist that they are not denouncing people. They say
they are denouncing sexual acts between people of the same sex—a sinful choice, not a
status. But for those of us who see sexual orientation as akin to race, homosexuality and
heterosexuality are simply part of a person’s identity. From this perspective, “hate the
sin, but love the sinner” is akin to “love the black person, hate the blackness.”
Id. at 484. But, it seems a reasonable distinction. While there is no distinction between being black and,
at least in the relevant sense, blackness, there is a distinction between one’s sexual orientation and one’s
activities. An assertion that God demands premarital sexual abstinence is not an attack on
heterosexuality, and an assertion that sodomy is sinful may not be an attack on homosexuality. If the
student is drawing this distinction in the message on the T-shirt, it may not be hate speech.
361. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).

206

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

speech and may be seen to agree with its content by children too young to
understand the intricacies of constitutional law; or, they ban the speech and are
seen by those children as supportive of the right of all groups to obtain an
education in a setting of dignity and equality.

